The goals and methods of the environmental organizations in Israel have changed profoundly over the sixty years since the founding of the State. Israeli scholars have pointed to a broad paradigm shift from an early romantic, nature-centered approach to a more pragmatic, public-health emphasis, relying on tools of science, law, and land-use planning (de-Shalit 1995; Tal 2002; Schwartz 2009). At a global scale, paradigm shifts within the environmental movement have also been suggested, representing periods of extreme change with regard to priority environmental issues and policy prescriptions (Carter 2007). Citing the continuing global environmental crisis, some advocate for a new paradigm shift in Israel (Schwartz 2009) and similarly in the United States (Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2005), that would integrate social issues into the environmental agenda. In this chapter, we examine whether the environmental movement in Israel is on the cusp of a paradigm shift toward convergence with a broader social-justice agenda. We use case studies of three relatively recent campaigns to ponder the current and future trajectory of the environmental movement in Israel.

An important contextual note: the history of the young Israeli environmental movement is being written by active participants who are creating that same history (look no further than this very edited volume, as its authors all have been intimately involved in the same environmental history that they are writing), rather than by more sober and detached historical analysts. In
this chapter, we quote widely from the writings of these participants. Further, we—the authors of this chapter—are not only participants in the same environmental movement, but also colleagues and friends of many of the primary actors.

PARADIGM SHIFTS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Scholars of environmental studies describe broad paradigm shifts in the development of the environmental movement in the developed world (e.g., Europe, the United States, and Japan). Carter (2007), for example, describes three “generations” of environmental issues (table 17.1). Prior to the 1960s, the first generation focused on preservation of wildlife and habitats and was represented by economic elite and middle-class interest in aesthetics, hiking, hunting, and other forms of nature recreation. Other prominent issues on the environmental agenda were soil conservation and dealing with localized environmental problems, which were generally byproducts of a century of industrialization. The second generation of issues, emerging during the 1960s, has been termed “modern environmentalism.” Among the main issues confronted by this generation were population growth, the environmental impact of technology, air pollution, safe drinking water, hazardous waste management, and pesticide use.

Notably, it was during this period that environmentalism evolved into a broader ideology and political movement framed around questions of values and behaviors. Accordingly, the environmental movement became a mass movement drawing from all sectors of society, as exemplified by society-wide participation in the first Earth Day in 1970 (Carter 2007). Beginning in the mid-1970s, Carter suggests, a new, third generation began to think about global issues such as acid rain, ozone depletion, climate change, and loss of global biodiversity. These activists and professionals pushed for and responded to the proliferation of environmental policies and regulatory bureaucracies to promote and enforce new environmental laws and agreements at the national and international levels.

Conco and Debelko (1998) suggest a similar transition is witnessed in the differences between the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Environment in Stockholm, which is symbolic of Carter’s second generation, and the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, which is more reminiscent of the third generation (or even the fourth, as we will describe below). The Stockholm Conference was characterized by narrow representation of government representatives focusing on air and water pollution. The latter, by contrast, was attended by a broad range of government representatives, nongovernmental organizations, and grassroots activists and was centered on large-scale and integrated global ecology issues. Further, Conco
Table 17.1. Phases of development of the global and Israeli environmental movement

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<td>Phases of development in the global environmental movement</td>
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<td><strong>Romantic Ruralism</strong></td>
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<td><em>Pre-1960s</em></td>
<td><em>Early twentieth century</em></td>
<td><em>Prior to 1980s</em></td>
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<td>&quot;Middle class interest in the protection of wildlife, wilderness and natural resources&quot;</td>
<td>-Infusing nature with quasi-religious meaning, reconnecting Jews with the physical land</td>
<td>-Goal of protecting nature from development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Latent anxiety plants seeds of desire to transform landscape</td>
<td>-Deep roots in the Zionist movement</td>
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<td>-Instrumental and romantic</td>
<td>-Nature education for strengthening attachment to the land</td>
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<td><strong>The Ethos of Development</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Ethos of Development</strong></td>
<td><strong>Public Health</strong></td>
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<td><em>1930s to late 1980s</em></td>
<td><em>1930s to late 1980s</em></td>
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<td>-Conquest of nature</td>
<td>-Conquest of nature</td>
<td>-Refocus on individual well-being</td>
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<td>-Civilizing the environment</td>
<td>-Civilizing the environment</td>
<td>-Humans as part of the environment rather than separate from nature</td>
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<td>-Afforestation</td>
<td>-Afforestation</td>
<td>-Values subservient to &quot;objective&quot; science</td>
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<td>-Swamp drainage</td>
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<td>-Urban development</td>
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<td>-Instrumental and rational</td>
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<td><strong>Modern Environmentalism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Modern Environmentalism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Place-Based Environmentalism</strong></td>
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<td><em>1960s to 1970s</em></td>
<td><em>Late 1980s through mid-1990s</em></td>
<td><strong>The present</strong></td>
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<td>-Popular concern about the environment; proliferation of environmental discourse</td>
<td>-Scientifically based philosophy derived from ecology and environmental sciences</td>
<td>-Creating a vision of a good society and a healthy environment</td>
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<td>-Global ecological crisis threatens humanity</td>
<td>-Decline in anxiety about the landscape</td>
<td>-Synthesis of lessons of previous phases, addressing deficiencies, but emphasizing advantages</td>
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<td>-Political and activist mass movement demanding radical transformation in values and societal structure</td>
<td>-Rational and non-instrumental</td>
<td>-Humans as integral part of natural world, who must define how to best integrate</td>
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<td><strong>Global Issues</strong></td>
<td><strong>Public Health</strong></td>
<td><strong>Public Health</strong></td>
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<td><em>1970s to present</em></td>
<td><em>1980s to the present</em></td>
<td><em>1980s to the present</em></td>
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<td>-Institutionalization of environmentalism, with national ministries, organizations, and policy at the national and global level</td>
<td>-Refocus on individual well-being</td>
<td>-Creating a vision of a good society and a healthy environment</td>
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<td>-Synthesis of lessons of previous phases, addressing deficiencies, but emphasizing advantages</td>
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<td>-Humans as integral part of natural world, who must define how to best integrate</td>
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<td>-Public health is an extension of good environmental planning and management (e.g., what is good for nature is good for people and vice versa).</td>
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and Debelko note that, in 1972 not all governments had national-level environmental bureaucracies, while twenty years later virtually all nations represented at the Rio conference did. A final important difference was the internationalization of environmental problems. In Stockholm, the agenda was set largely by the industrialized nations, while at Rio the developing world had much greater influence on setting the conference agenda.

A fourth generation of environmentalism began to emerge around the time of the Rio Conference, and ever since has evolved into a broader-based political movement that emphasizes environmental problems as a symptom of more fundamental societal problems of poverty, economic and social inequality, and the loss of communal identity. The Global Greens, a coordinating body of national Green Parties around the world, provides a telling example. Its charter, approved by members from seventy-two countries, elevates to the forefront of Green politics the following six principles: ecological wisdom, social justice (“equitable distribution of social and natural resources”), participatory democracy, nonviolence, sustainability (“provide for the needs of the present and future generations within the finite resources of the earth”), and respect for diversity (Global Greens 2001).

An evolution toward linking environmental to socioeconomic and political issues seems to comply with the theme of Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ controversial tome, “The Death of Environmentalism” (2005). This analysis of the American environmental dynamics advocates for a broad-based coalition to combat climate change while simultaneously addressing socioeconomic issues. It recommends bringing together labor groups and environmental groups, as well as private- and public-sector investment, in common cause. Because of their emphasis on markets, these authors’ worldview seems to diverge from the Global Greens in economic terms, and Shellenberger and Nordhaus oppose the use of “environmental justice” as a distraction; it is, they claim, ineffectual in addressing the needs of weaker segments of society (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007). Both they and the Greens, however, seek to broaden the base of environmental thinking to incorporate social and economic well-being.

The Israeli environmental movement has undergone similar paradigm shifts (de-Shalit 1995; Tal 2002; Schwartz 2009). Similar to the early stages of the American environmental movement, it began with a romantic emphasis on nature preservation. The first Zionist settlers (at least those who represented the Labor Zionist stream of the movement) attached mythical qualities to land and the nature within, as a crucial component of their national redemption. Yet, de-Shalit describes a collective anxiety about the natural environment in Palestine and the beginnings of settlers’ strong desire to transform the landscape to something more familiar. From the 1930s this anxiety would
lead to a development paradigm that eclipsed sympathies for nature preservation. Those individuals who clung to nature preservation in the face of this push for economic growth and development found themselves relegated to the margins of Israeli society. Yet this cohort would nonetheless form the core of the new Israeli environmental movement that emerged in the early 1950s.

That was when protectors of nature in Israel came together in opposition to the draining of the Hula wetlands as proposed by the Jewish National Fund. The opposition consisted of academics from the biological sciences (ecologists, zoologists, botanists), alongside kibbutz members and young activists. They founded a new organization, the Society for Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI), whose name reflected their preservationist ambitions (Tal 2002). The emphasis in Israel on establishing nature reserves and protecting attractive, charismatic species is similar to the early years of the American environmental movement, which was symbolized by such figures as John Muir in the early years and later by the Sierra Club's David Brower.

The nature preservation focus was a direct result of the cultural context in which the movement founders lived—like their fellow pro-development citizens, they were infused with Zionist ideology. These “pioneer” environmentalists believed that Jews were returning to Israel to redeem themselves and the Jewish nation by reconnecting to the historic, physical, and biological land of Israel (Tal 2002, 2006). Israeli author and Knesset member Yizhar Smilanski’s 1962 speech to the Knesset, a plea to protect open spaces, is exemplary in this regard:

"A land where the breeze blows without wildflowers is a place of suffocation. A land where winds cannot blow uninterrupted will be a hotel, note a homeland. A land that is all roads and sidewalks and a sense of ultimate construction will devour all good portions in the hearts of its young people."

Smilanski concludes with a rhetorical, Zionist question: “What should the leaders of the nation do if they want the people of this land to love their land?” (quoted in Tal 2006, 21–24). The answer for Smilanski was to preserve open space and the nature within.

Israeli scholars and activists emphasize the close links between early Israeli environmentalism and the political ideology of Zionism (de-Shalit 1995). There was a synergy, which continues to this day, between activists’ desire to protect landscapes that they considered part of their cultural identity and the use of national parks and reserves for the purposes of emphasizing Jewish and Israeli culture and history. For Eilon Schwartz, director of the Heschel Center for Environmental Learning and Leadership, this particular focus for the environmental movement was a unique feature of the first paradigm of Israeli environmental thinking (Schwartz 2009). He recalls how Jewish youth would be “consecrated” through national hikes (Ben-David 1997) and by acquiring
encyclopedic knowledge of the trees, flowers, birds, and mammals of the Land of Israel. The formal and informal educational system was co-opted to instill in the youth an appreciation of the natural history of Israel (also see Gordon in this volume). The SPNI, as the first Israeli environmental organization and a major educational body, was founded within this social-cultural milieu and became instrumental in perpetuating it.

The second environmental paradigm in Israel began in the 1980s, toward what de-Shalit calls a scientifically based environmental philosophy, focusing primarily on public health (Tal 2002; Schwartz 2009). These dates follow closely after Carter’s “second generation” of global environmental issues (1960s–1970s), catalyzed by the discovery of mercury poisoning in Minamata Bay, Japan (1959) and the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), among other events. New environmental organizations began to focus on public-health issues, the most prominent of those in the initial wave was “Malraz—The Public Council against Noise and Air Pollution” (Tal 2002). Though Malraz was responsible for dozens of grassroots anti-nuisance campaigns, the organization’s stature was nonetheless eclipsed by SPNI’s public profile during these years (Tal 2002).

Israel’s transition from the romantic to the scientific paradigm of environmentalism is captured in the Voice of America (VOA) controversy. In the mid-1980s, the American administration proposed to build a VOA radio transmission station in Israel’s northern Arava Valley (Ministry of Environment 1993). Environmentalists opposed the project on nature-driven grounds: the radio towers and the radiation that they would emit would have disrupted bird migration patterns over the Arava, and relatively pristine areas of the Negev desert would be violated by the relocation of Air Force training activities. Local residents added a new type of opposition, arguing from a public-health perspective that the electromagnetic radiation from the proposed towers would constitute a potential health risk.

There is some dispute over which argument was more significant in the decision to cancel the project: de-Shalit asserts that the public-health emphasis had the most significant effect on delaying the station construction (de-Shalit and Talias 1994; de-Shalit 2001); Tal gives much of the credit to the environmental movement, and the SPNI in particular, for bringing the concern for the Arava landscape and the migrating bird populations to public awareness and actively delaying the project until it was eventually cancelled by a new American administration (Tal 2002). Perhaps more attention should be given to the synergistic overlap between the two agendas of nature preservation and public-health concerns. Each agenda resonated with some of the public, or both together influenced individuals, and the combination of agen-
das and their public impact created enough opposition to delay the project until it was ultimately canceled, albeit for unrelated reasons.

By the early 1990s, the SPNI had become more diversified in its national agenda and increasingly grassroots in its orientation—also a reflection of the larger transformation occurring in Europe and the United States. Local SPNI chapters began to set their agendas in response to issues of environmental importance close to home. They were joined by a proliferation of new environmental organizations with unique, often site-specific, agendas (Tal 2002; Schwartz 2009). Many issues of concern for the SPNI chapters and for many of the new environmental organizations in the 1990s had a public-health focus. Further, major environmental organizations put public health in the center of their activities, including Adam Teva V'Din—the Israeli Union of Environmental Defense (IUED; air quality, waste, water quality, and quantity), the Coalition for Public Health (environmental health risks), and Green Course (air quality, waste, water, public transportation).

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, environmental values have proliferated into every aspect of Israeli life. From a mere handful of environmental organizations in the 1950s and '60s, “Life and Environment,” the umbrella organization of many of Israel’s environmental organizations, now claims well over one hundred members. These operate on the local, regional, and national scene and are widely diverse in their issues of concern and target constituencies. All media outlets regularly cover environmental issues. Environmental representatives sit on the national planning board. Representatives of the Israel Green Party have been elected to municipal government, and are, in several cases, an integral part of governing coalitions in municipalities. Environmental organizations have advocated successfully to enact a broad range of environmental laws and environmental concerns that are prominent in Israel’s long-term national development plan (National Outline Plan 35).

Despite these gains in activism, media coverage, public support, and electoral presence, many argue that the environmental agenda in Israel is still too limited to bring about lasting change. In 2010, for example, the Green Environment Fund, a consortium of funders of environmental organizations in Israel, launched a process to identify means to expand the agenda of the environmental movement, catalyzing a broader debate among the leadership.

Also in response to the belief that movement gains have not been enough to create an environmentally sustainable society, Schwartz (2009) suggests the need for a new “place-based” paradigm, combining the advantages of the nature preservation and the public-health approaches with a community-based component. In such a paradigm, humans would increasingly see themselves as part of natural systems, and nature would be seen as an intricate part of
the human day-to-day living experience, rather than something separate, removed, and untouched. Schwartz calls for the environmental movement to develop a more pluralistic and inclusive agenda, including such pressing issues as rapid population growth, increased material consumption, militarism, and the inequitable distribution of wealth.

A CONVERGENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL AGENDAS?

Has the environmental movement in Israel embraced the notion that environmental challenges are driven by particular social and economic factors that need to be addressed? We use three environmental campaign case studies to assess whether the environmental movement’s agenda has been converging with that of the social-justice movement, or whether social and environmental movements work together primarily for convenience. Did the environmental groups, on the one hand, and social justice groups, on the other, arrive at similar conclusions regarding the root causes of problems and the ways to address them, revealing a convergence of views and values? Or did they come together for tactical reasons to jointly attack the same problem from different perspectives, suggesting a merger of convenience? Or has an overlap emerged because the leadership of environmental and social-justice groups is drawn from the same social milieu or activist pool, whether or not the movement as a whole supports the joint message (fig. 17.1)?

**Figure 17.1.** Possible trajectories of collaboration between the environmental and social-justice movements.
For each case, we look at the goals and the people involved, probing whether the campaign transcended traditional “green’ goals” (e.g., clean air and water, open space) to include a social agenda (e.g., employment opportunities in low-income areas, access to affordable housing and to transport, and spatial integration). We consider whether the leaders and activists were drawn from the social-justice movement alongside the environmental movement, and whether the campaign integrated the needs of low-income or marginal groups in society. We also seek to understand how the combination of social and environmental agendas influenced the outcome of the campaign.

**Campaign One: The Trans-Israel Highway**

The fight against the Trans-Israel Highway (Route 6) was one of the paramount priorities of the national Israeli environmental movement throughout much of the 1990s—and is usually considered one of its more conspicuous failures (Tal 2002; Garb 2004; Maizlish 2005). Despite the failure at blocking the grandiose North–South toll highway, the campaign is credited with changing the image and style of the environmental movement in Israel (see Maizlish 2005 for a detailed description of the campaign activities and an analysis of the lessons to be learned for organizers). During the course of the campaign, the message changed from aesthetic concerns to protection of open space, and then to the problems of car dependency and the need for investment in public transit, particularly rail. Here, we look at the extent to which the campaign evolved to include a social-justice message, alongside the more traditional environmental concerns.

The initial opposition to the highway was late in coming. Its route was first approved in 1976, as part of the National Outline Plan for Roads (NOP 3 1976). In 1993 the Society for Protection of Nature in Israel initially suggested minor changes in the route to reduce the roadway’s aesthetic impact and to protect sites of particular natural beauty or interest.

The IUED was then asked to take a stronger stance and petitioned the Supreme Court, in their first major case concerning planning and open space case (Maizlish 2005). The legal argument was largely procedural, objecting to the lack of an integrated Environmental Impact Statement, in contrast to the analysis of each discrete segment of the road. The Supreme Court rejected the legal petition, and the Highway Company marketed the rejection as a triumph for the highway, a nail in the coffin of the environmentalists’ objections.

Environmentalists continued to oppose the highway’s construction. By 1995, the SPNI was running full-page newspaper advertisements charging that the road would cut through open landscape on the eastern border with the Palestinian administered territories, irreparably damaging favorite hiking grounds, wildflowers, and wildlife habitats.
But this limited, first-generation paradigm message seemed particularly weak when contrasted to the arguments marshaled in favor of the highway: it would bring economic prosperity by improving access to the geographic periphery; enable young families to build single-family homes in previously remote areas; and would be built at nearly no cost to the taxpayer, through a “Build-Operate-and-Transfer” mechanism (Garb 2004). The star-studded leadership of the highway company, headed by a popular former IDF chief of staff with the founding general director of the Ministry of Environment and highly respected landscape architects, used clever military tactics to establish the highway as part of the national ethos. They named the road “The Way of the Land,” erected signposts declaring “This Way to Highway 6” at major road intersections years before any construction had begun, and distributed hundreds of thousands of free maps of Israel marking the highway as fact (Garb 2004). A few years later, after the assassination of the Yitzhak Rabin, highway planners declared that the future highway would be named after, and thus immortalize, the prime minister. By contrast environmentalists’ arguments of the high-speed roadway’s damage to wildflowers may have seemed petty, elitist, or anti-progress.

The campaign message and tactics began to change as the opposition’s leadership spread from the SPNI old guard to younger activists from the newly formed Green Course and the radical Green Action. Camping in tents on construction sites and confronting bulldozers while riding bicycles (and wearing superhero capes), they argued that mass highways were old-style economic development, and that true economic progress involved freedom from car-dependency and increased investment in public transit.

The SPNI listened, and, along with a new professional transit advocacy organization, Transport Today and Tomorrow, began to include new messages and new partners: the highway would swallow vast tracts of public land and bring low-density urban sprawl; the costs of the highway to the taxpayer would be high, since the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) funding mechanism required the government to guarantee revenues up to a high threshold (Garb 1999), and this money should be spent on rail not roads. They also argued that the highway was not fairly compensating Arab towns and Jewish rural communities whose lands would be confiscated for road construction and whose quality of life would be compromised through proximity to the highway.

There were other groups opposed to the road. Landowners, including Jewish collective communities and Arab villages, along the proposed highway route opposed the confiscation of their land for road construction and the potential noise nuisance that would come from the road (Maranz 1993). There was also a potential for opposition to the road on economic grounds, as the road would draw away funding from public transportation and discrimi-
nate against citizens who were dependent on those modes of transportation (Fletcher 1999).

While there was some degree of collaboration between landowners and environmentalists, in retrospect, it appears that the alliances across these partners were mostly tactical, and not really a convergence of environmental, social, and economic concerns. The landowners were motivated by “how” questions, rather than “why,” and their claims were resolved with adjustments to the roads route and compensation (Garb 2004). The environmentalists, meanwhile, never reached out for a broad-based coalition with the economically disadvantaged, never tried to find common ground that the highway discriminated against those with less access to private automobiles and thus dependent on public transportation (Fletcher 1999), and didn’t manage to enlist the mayors and populations in the urban centers in support of funding for public transit. The environmentalists also remained largely agnostic to the geopolitical implications of the highway route, which created a de facto border for the many Arab-Israeli towns that now found themselves to the east of the major highway.

With the wisdom of hindsight, the anti-highway campaign may have failed (the highway has long since been paved and even lengthened and widened), but the new alliances formed in the campaign against the Trans-Israel Highway signals a transition within the widening environmental movement to broaden its messages and membership. The struggle may also have contributed to the major increase in budget for rail—from 90 million NIS in 1995 to 1 billion in 2003 (Maizlish 2005). Yet the campaign did not promote a full-fledged third-paradigm approach to public transportation as the economically, socially, and environmentally preferred alternative to road construction.

**Campaign Two: Preservation of Open Spaces in the Negev**

The social and environmental challenges posed by residential development in the Negev provide excellent case studies of how the social and environmental movements interact over an issue of potentially shared interest. Bedouin and various Jewish communities desire to expand residential settlement, while environmental groups have sought to preserve open spaces and prevent urban and exurban sprawl and social-justice groups seek equitable settlement policies for all Negev residents. To understand the perspective of the environmental movement on this heated topic, a short background on open-space preservation as an environmental issue is required.

Open-space preservation has been a perennial high-priority issue of the Israeli environmental movement since the 1950s, although the goals and foci have changed. In early open-space preservation campaigns that sought to save landscapes in their perceived pristine condition, agricultural development
was seen as threat. Today, with urbanization and transportation-infrastructure development seen as much greater threats to open space, agriculture has increasingly been viewed as another form of open space worthy of protection. Environmentalists increasingly speak in terms of cultural landscapes and advocate for farmland preservation relying on historic, aesthetic, and cultural values (Egoz 1996; Feitelson 1999), not unlike modern farmland-preservation discourse in North America and Europe.

The diversified approach to open spaces, not only as natural areas, but as areas for human use, often appears in government and environmental NGO discourse at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The comprehensive national outline plan (NOP 35) for urban development and open-space preservation embodies this approach in its definition of various types of landscape templates to protect, ranging from agricultural to natural (Assif and Shachar 2005; Han in this volume).

The Open Landscape Institute (DESHE) is explicit in its vision statement: “Open spaces are the basis of life for people and natural phenomena alike. The unique natural and cultural heritage found in Israel, so meaningful to Jews, Muslims and Christians here and around the world, is found in [Israel’s] open landscapes. Safeguarding our open landscapes is essential for the supply of vital environmental and social services that will ensure the quality of life for Israel’s ever-growing population” (DESHE 2010).

The DESHE statement suggests that a third-paradigm merger of social and environmental concerns is under way. Environmentalists, the statement suggests, should prioritize quality of life and access to all scales of public space—from the neighborhood and regional parks to wilderness preservation—for all of Israel’s diverse citizens.

Such a paradigm shift is not without its problems. One difficult dilemma still challenging the convergence of the social and environmental paradigms concerns the conflict between preservation of open space and the development needs of the large Arab-Israeli minority (see Tarabeih in this volume). These citizens live in separate towns with a far less developed urban infrastructure. While Jewish Israeli environmentalists tend to perceive the preservation of open space as a common good, Israel’s Arab citizens frequently experience efforts to preserve open space as merely another restriction placed upon Arab towns and villages to prevent their development (Khamaisi 2006).

This feeling is exacerbated when considering a culturally different perception of “open spaces” (Benstein 2003) and the long history in Israel of discrimination with regard to access to land reserves for development (Yiftachel and Meir 1998; Tarabeih in this volume). We can learn about whether a second to third paradigm shift is occurring by observing the response of the en-
environmental movement to this quandary: does the environmental movement consider the social impacts of open-space preservation and if so, for whom? The case study of Negev residential development may provide some answers.

Approximately half of the Negev’s 160,000 Bedouin live in villages whose legal status on the land the State does not recognize. Further, rapid population growth in this community has led to residential development on open-space reserves not designated for such uses in statutory master plans (Yahel 2006; Tal 2008). The phenomenon typically is described in politically charged terms, whether as:

- Bedouin expressing their legitimate rights to live in the Negev;
- an inevitable outcome of the inability of the state and the Bedouin to come to a mutually agreeable long-term solution regarding land ownership and settlement or;
- general disregard for Israeli law displayed by the Bedouin, at the expense of preservation of ecological integrity or, alternatively, potential future Zionist settlements in the Negev.

Despite broadly accepted planning principles not to establish new residential settlements in Israel as embodied in the legislated National Outline Plan 35 (Assif and Shachar 2005), new Jewish ranches and settlements have been promoted and established in contravention of established planning norms (Yonah and Saporta 2002; Alfasi 2006; Orenstein and Hamburg 2009; also see Han in this volume). These ranches and settlements are often promoted as responses to the “demographic challenge” posed by the Bedouin to the State in the Negev. There are three discourses that characterize the opposition to these new communities:

- **the environmental discourse**—detached, low-density settlements are environmentally harmful;
- **the justice discourse**—we cannot provide residential opportunities to Jewish residents while denying Bedouin the same; and
- **the rule-of-law discourse**—these settlements were established without following the proper planning procedures and are often in direct violation of them, a discourse that is also used with regard to the Bedouin (Alfasi 2006; Yahel 2006).¹

A broad, unofficial coalition of opposition has indeed developed around the establishment of Jewish single-family ranches in the Negev, ranging from Bimkom, an NGO of progressive urban and regional planners, and The Arab Center for Alternative Planning, representing the justice discourse, to IUED and SPNI, representing the environmental discourse. Tal (2008) suggests that
environmentalists found it useful to raise the rule of law discourse in particular to effectively gain support and garner governmental opposition to the ranches.

A 2003 SPNI position paper on the topic of new settlements and ranches affirmed the social as well as the environmental impact of these controversial new communities. It lists under the anticipated social impact of such new settlement development: (1) drawing higher-income families away from existing cities, thereby leaving the cities with poorer population; (2) introducing competition for new members with existing smaller communities, and (3) drawing public funding away from communities with greater needs. The SPNI concludes its position paper with a lofty statement calling on settlement policy to focus on providing for the residential needs of the entire population and closing the economic and social gaps between all sectors, including between Arabs and Jews (Han et al. 2003).

But while there is an ad hoc coalition of environmental and social-justice organizations united in its opposition to single-family farms and a limited cross-fertilization of ideas, there are also crucial differences in their approaches to the issue that do not suggest a true convergence. Alongside that rhetoric of social justice, for example, the SPNI document also continues to employs terminology that refers to the “demographic problem”—a blatant euphemism for describing regions in the country with more Arabs than Jews, used to justify land-use policies that discriminate against Arab citizens of Israel (Orenstein and Hamburg 2009): “Demographic balance is a desirable and important goal, although scattering many small and weak settlements does not contribute significantly to enlarging the Jewish population in the periphery. For the price of new communities, it would be possible to attract a large portion of the public to existing cities and smaller communities. Establishing new points of settlement . . . not only does not help strengthen the periphery, but it also places an economic and social burden on existing communities and in this way saps their strength” (Han et al. 2003, 6).

This statement does not suggest that inequitable access to environmental resources (land) is the problem to be addressed, but rather objects to the inappropriate geographic placement of new Jewish settlements. Their simultaneous condemnation of all forms of illegal settlement (e.g., ranches and unrecognized Bedouin settlement) ignores the very different underlying drivers and significance of each phenomenon, while exposing them to criticism from not only advocates for the Bedouin, but also Jewish-Zionist advocates. For example, at a 2010 meeting of the Israel Union of Ecology and Environmental Sciences, audience members chastised an SPNI speaker who spoke critically about Jewish ranches for ignoring the proliferation of Bedouin settlements in the Negev.
For their part, social-justice organizations generally do not include environmental considerations in their discourse on Negev settlement, as reflected in a recent comprehensive report on the situation of the unrecognized Bedouin villages (Yehudkin 2007). In fact, this report attempts to downplay fears of uncontrolled sprawling Bedouin development across the Negev by citing the amount of land claimed by Bedouins as a percentage of total area (640,000 dunam, or less than 5.0 percent of the total area of Beersheva subdistrict). The one exception in this report in which environmental issues are addressed is reference to residents of unrecognized villages living without proper infrastructure (water, sewage, roads). All environmental concerns are shown to be interpreted through the lens of social injustice.

A stronger collaboration between environmental and social-justice organizations on the issue of single-family ranches could have yielded mutually desired results but seemed to have lacked true convergence of ideas. The ranches are detrimental to open spaces, disperse road and sewage infrastructure in the Negev inefficiently, and are contrary to the higher-density planning vision set out in NOP 35. They also represent an extreme example of social injustice, in which Jewish families, from anywhere in the country, are authorized to establish superlow-density ranches on large plots, while local Bedouin families are restricted from agricultural practices and land claims. Despite the potential for common action among environmental and social activists, in 2010 the Knesset was able to pass legislation authorizing the ranches and their discriminatory impact. Arguably, a shared vision for equitable and environmentally sound Negev settlement and collaborative campaign might have prevented such a setback. And had the groups so coalesced, they might have served as an example of Schwartz’s third paradigm (e.g., Orenstein 2007), which calls for a true integration of social justice and environmental goals.

CAMPAIGN THREE: HIRIYA, FROM LANDFILL TO URBAN PARK

Official approval to transform an enormous garbage dump at Hiriya into one of the country’s largest metropolitan national parks is usually considered among the major environmental successes of the decade. *Time Magazine* once described the Hiriyah site as “a symbol of national sloppiness and ecological neglect” (Beyer 1998), but a major environmental campaign led to a dramatic reversal of its condition, leading to plans to establish there an innovative 700-hectare urban park. As the Israel Union for Environmental Defense writes on its website: “The park will, in the future, serve two million residents in the Gush Dan area and in the whole country, and will be a symbol of environmental and social justice across the generations. Although the process has gone on for many years, the strength and dedication to purpose has paid off.”3

The plans for the park and the campaign to receive governmental plan-
ning permission have been documented from numerous angles, including the environmental benefits of the park (Ministry of Environment 2005), the park design and landscaping (Alon-Mozes, 2011), the peculiar role of philanthropy in influencing planning (Ronen-Rotem 2011), and the “privatization of planning” (Arad-Tzvi 2010). Here we focus on a key conflict in the campaign that elucidates the tensions between environmental and social approaches: should the park be used to help regenerate adjacent dilapidated neighborhoods, or should its purpose be to preserve open space? At the heart of the conflict was a controversial proposal to develop housing on some of the park land.

The first vision for the park was launched by the Israel Lands Authority (ILA) in 1995, two years after the decision to close the waste-disposal site. The ILA plan, drawn up by architects Shamai Assif and Na’ama Maizels, emphasized the social transformation of the nearby run-down neighborhoods as well as urban needs for recreation and green open space (Assif 1996). The plans included a significant component of real-estate activity: about two thousand homes, some public buildings, and office structures were to be located adjacent to new “gates” into the park.

The rationale for including these homes and workspaces was in accordance with the prevailing concept that real-estate revenues could be used to leverage park funding. A second rationale was more explicitly rooted in urban design: to frame the area around the park, provide attractive new entrance points, and change the image of the surrounding neighborhoods “from the backyard of Tel Aviv to the front court of the metropolitan area.” A change was indeed in order—two of the neighborhoods bordering the park were home to hundreds of illegally constructed tin shanties, possibly the highest concentration of poverty in the entire metropolitan region (fig. 17.2).

During the second stage of planning, responsibility for master-planning the park was transferred from the ILA to the Ministry of Interior’s district planning office in Tel Aviv. The district plans were strongly influenced by an unanticipated player—Martin Weill, the charismatic former chief curator of the Israel Museum and newly appointed head of the philanthropic Bracha Foundation. Weill saw the landfill as “a sore in the very belly of the country,” and proposed funding to transform the landfill into a park, including an international architectural competition that would ensure high standards of design (Y. Farhi, pers. comm., April 16, 2009; M. Weill, pers. comm., June 21, 2009).

Figure 17.2. (Opposite) From Landfill to Central Park. A vision for the Ayalon Park (above) and an adjacent neighborhood of Argazim (below). Environmental activists wanted to assure no building in the park boundaries, while some social activists suggested that a limited amount of construction could have provided a lift to nearby impoverished communities. Photograph above reprinted with permission of Park Ayalon. Photograph below by E. Silverman.
The new district plan re-envisioned the park, from an urban park with uses aimed at local residents, to a metropolitan-level park serving the entire Gush Dan region. It downplayed the original social objectives and aspects of neighborhood planning, and focused exclusively on the design and management of open spaces. Among the environmental challenges addressed were solving hydrological problems of drainage, methane capture, and utilization in the former landfill; flood containment and sewage runoff; the hazards of landfill closure; and waste treatment and recycling (Plessner, Guggenheim, and Kaplan 1997; Ministry of Interior 2003).

The district plans initially incorporated the previous proposals for residential and office construction (Plessner et al. 1997) in discrete areas of the park. Mayors of the adjacent towns also supported including an aspect of real-estate development in the plan, vying among themselves for development and assessment rights (D. SAPIR, pers. comm., May 20, 2009; D. STERNBERG, pers. comm., April 16, 2009; A. TZACH, pers. comm., June 21, 2009). In 2003 the National Planning and Building Commission submitted the plans for formal statutory approval, including limited residential development (Ministry of Interior 2003).

The modest proportions of development were challenged by private landholders within the park territory, who requested substantial additional development rights, proposing ten thousand units of housing and high-rise office buildings on lands earmarked for recreation. The landholders and their representatives were well known in Israel as “real estate sharks” with a history of shrewdly reaping massive profits by rezoning agricultural land as commercial real estate. The landholders were also notorious for their ability to enlist politicians and planning officials in support of profitable development plans (Lichtman 2004; Rinat 2004).

It was at this point that the environmental organizations got involved. In an unusual move, the district planners and the philanthropic funder decided to work together to launch an all-out campaign to preserve the entire area as open space for future generations, with no development whatsoever (N. ANGEL, pers. comm., April 16, 2009; Y. FARHI, pers. comm. April 16, 2009). This coalition reached out to recruit environmental NGOs, which had tacitly supported the plans, but had not yet been actively involved (Arad-Tzvi 2010). The IUED then challenged the legal rights of the landholders (in this case, the HaZera Company, who had leased the land for agricultural purposes from the Israel Lands Authority), while the Tel Aviv branch of the SPNI headed up the public campaign to keep the future park free of development. SPNI reasoned that parks, like hospitals and trains, could and should be funded by the state, without reliance on the private sector (M. MAHADAV, pers. comm., May 20, 2009). The foundation also hired a lobbyist, who worked hard to enlist lo-
cal mayors in a joint agreement to renounce all development claims within the park. Facing an election year in 2003, the mayors may have wanted to distance themselves from any taint of corruption and agreed to drop all claims to development (D. Sapir, pers. comm., May 20, 2009; A. Tzach, pers. comm., June 21, 2009).

The landholders responded by hiring their own lobbyist—a former staffer at the IUED—who used a surprising tactic. On November 16, 2004, they published ads in national newspapers crudely headlined “The Greens Are Screwing the Blacks,” claiming that environmentalists were killing the park at the expense of the poor families of Sephardic (locally known as Oriental or “Mizrachi”) origins in the area, by pursuing long-range fantasies of open space that would never be funded (Rinat 2004). The ad, which generated much media buzz, was published in the name of six Mizrachi neighborhood leaders from the area.

The environmental organizations struck back, arguing that local residents would benefit the most from the park-as-green-space. They enlisted a network of local activists and an environmentalist active in the Mizrachi Rainbow Forum (a social-justice organization). Together, they managed to convince the signatories to publicly retract and announce their support for a development-free park (S. Avidan, pers. comm., April 16, 2009; R. Hananel, pers. comm., May 7, 2009). Leading environmental activists later acknowledged that they never held discussions among themselves or with local residents about the potential benefits of moderate development, since the pressing campaign required uncompromising opposition to the plans of the specific landholders, and therefore to any development at all (M. Mahadav, pers. comm., May 20, 2009). At least two of the environmentalists in retrospect acknowledged that some degree of development in the park might indeed be beneficial for local residents, the surrounding cities, and the park itself (I. Han, pers. comm., April 16, 2009; M. Mahadav, pers. comm., May 20, 2009). It could also be argued that the low-income local residents would have benefited more directly through gaining immediate access to the extensive adjacent botanic gardens at Mikveh Yisrael, currently lacking funding and closed to the public. On November 11, 2004, a subcommittee of the National Planning and Building Committee unanimously approved the plans for the park with no development rights (see Arad-Tzvi 2010 for a nuanced description of the unprecedented intervention by the prime minister, who personally instructed government representatives to vote against development in the park). As of the summer of 2010, the park is still largely unfunded, and the adjacent areas have become ever-more run down.

Does this case represent a third paradigm convergence of the environmental and the social agendas? After all, the SPNI was able to draw on a net-
work of activists from the low-income neighborhoods and to argue that preservation of the park without any new building would be in their long-term interests. Its actions, however, were tactical and its position ran counter to the best interests of the area’s local low-income population, representing then a narrow first- and second-paradigm approach. The environmental movement led a hard-nosed, top-down public campaign to prohibit all real-estate development in the park, choosing the long-term benefit of open space over the immediate needs of the local population for developed park land and decent affordable housing. The environmentalist response to this conflict is indicative of the still persistent rift between the environmental and the social-justice movements.

LEARNING TO WORK TOGETHER

The case studies of the Trans-Israel Highway, Open Space and the Bedouin settlement in the Negev, and the Hiriya Metropolitan Park provide evidence for the potential convergence between the social and environmental movements in Israel. In each case, the leadership and activists were drawn from both environmental and social organizations and the campaign rhetoric included joint messages. The collaboration of diverse organizations and a synthesis of their messages can be seen as strengthening their advocacy positions and expanding their influence, contributing toward their shared success.

However, a closer look at the case studies indicates that convenience has been the primary driver for collaborative work, and not a convergence of worldviews. Each campaign involved a conflict or potential trade-off between the environmental agenda—primarily open space protection—and the social agendas of a more equitable distribution of resources and improved standard of living for minority and low-income groups. This includes funding for public transit, adequate settlement standards for Bedouin, affordable housing for low-income Jewish residents in the center of the country, equal rights for Israeli-Arab citizens and resolution of the broader geopolitical struggle. Most of these conflicts went unaddressed or ignored by the campaigns’ leadership. Perhaps not surprisingly, these episodes were marked by the formation of ad hoc (and ephemeral) collaborations, creating often-amicable human ties across the leadership, but failing to create an operational relationship that continued beyond the given campaign.

Yet there are at least three new directions within the environmental movement that support the move toward a real convergence. A first important voice is from the philanthropic funders, including Shatil and New Israel Fund, which includes social equity and environmental sustainability within its funding purview, and which has been a consistent advocate of framing environmental issues in terms of justice and equity. Shatil’s current funding
initiatives include empowering environmental leaders in Israel’s geographic peripheries to confront local environmental problems. The Green Environmental Fund, a collaboration of funders, is also actively seeking methods to incorporate a more explicit social message into the agenda of the environmental movement.

The second significant new voice for convergence is in the political realm. Until 2008, the only explicitly environmental party in Israel was the Israel Green Party, which had a strikingly narrow, second-paradigm agenda. In 2008 the Green Movement was established by many of the most prominent people within the environmental movement and has been noteworthy in its attempts to integrate social, economic, and environmental issues into a single political vision. While the leadership were predominantly prominent environmental activists (including Green Course founding director Eran Ben Yemini, planner and open-space advocate Iris Han, and Professor Alon Tal, who had started and directed a number of Israeli environmental organizations), the ideologues behind the party’s platform (Dr. Eilon Schwartz, cofounder of the Heschel Center, and Bar Ilan University professor Noah Efron) were strong advocates of a social-environmental platform that expanded well beyond the traditional issues typical of environmental politics. They integrated topics such as education, the status of women, privatization, and Arab-Jewish relations into the party platform. The participation of Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information codirector Dr. Gershon Baskin strengthened the pro-peace component of the party’s agenda.

Prior to the 2008 national elections, pragmatic considerations and converging ideological concerns led the party to merge with the liberal-religious party Meimad led by Rabbi Michael Melchior, whose primary issues were education, peace, and religious pluralism. The match between Meimad and the Green Movement further exemplifies the identity that this “third paradigm” environmental party was trying to establish for itself.

Although receiving close to 1 percent of the votes, the Green Movement failed to garner enough popular support in the 2008 elections to elect any members of Knesset (see Karrasin in this volume), and its future direction remains unclear. Some of the members still see its best chances in a purely environmental party, and further debate continues around the left-right orientation of the party with regard to relations with the Palestinians and the occupied territories. Accordingly, whether the Green Movement will be a second- or third-paradigm environmental party remains, in 2010, an open question.

A third indication of a possible convergence is found in the coalition opposing new legislation for reforms in land-use policy and planning. In early 2009, the newly elected Netanyahu government drafted legislation that would
fundamentally restructure the system of land ownership and management in Israel, in particular privatizing public lands. Some six months later, the government released proposals to streamline the planning process, including a significant reduction in public and civil-society involvement.

Social and environmental organizations worked together closely to oppose first the land-reform law and then the planning reform law. Coordinated through Shatil and dominated by the environmental organizations, the coalition featured strong participation by social organizations including the Organization for Distributive Justice, the Movement for Quality in Government in Israel, Bimkom—Planners for Planning Rights, and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (Chudy 2009). The names of the coalition are indicative of the significance accorded to the collaboration: the Social-Environmental Coalition against Land Privatization, and then the Coalition for Responsible Planning. Learning from their environmental colleagues, social-justice groups aimed to insert a new agenda into the proposed amendment to the planning law. This agenda includes a call for a social-impact assessment alongside environmental-impact statements, an expanded role for social advisers similar to environmental advisers, representation for the Ministry of Social Affairs as well as the Ministry of Environmental Protection, and new participation in planning by social-justice organizations alongside their environmental counterparts.

One additional indicator of a possible transition to a third-paradigm approach may be seen in the creation of new staff positions at SPNI, IUED and Shatil (the technical assistance arm of the New Israel Fund). These new positions are dedicated to assisting community-based groups to mobilize around issues of open-space protection and abating public-health hazards, alongside advocacy for more equitable distribution of resources and greater commitment to environmental issues among local elected leadership.

Although these trends are inchoate, there is compelling evidence of increasing patterns of collaboration between the social and environmental movements in Israel, although a true convergence is not strong enough to warrant announcing the transition to a new paradigm. This qualification is manifested in Israel’s 2009 election results. Although The Green Movement Party ran as a political expression of Israel’s progressive civil society, in fact it was dominated by environmentalists and did not succeed in attracting leading figures from Israel’s social movements. Perhaps one of the most significant factors in the increased collaboration is the “overlap” among the leadership (fig. 17.1), as key figures study together in programs such as the Heschel Center’s leadership program and Shatil workshops, joining together on campaigns and in committees.
For a true third-paradigm convergence to emerge, however, the organizations and their leadership will most likely need to engage directly with thorny conflicts across their agendas, including issues such as urban densities and building heights (high-rise buildings may allow for more “open space” but are typically more expensive than mid-rise buildings), job opportunities in polluting industries, and the distribution of water resources across different population groups. Further down the line, the organizations will need to address nuclear power and weapons capabilities, poverty, population growth, minority rights, and the impact of war and occupation—difficult issues anywhere, and perhaps particularly so in Israel.

NOTES

1. As of July 2010, some Jewish farm settlements whose legality were in question were retroactively sanctioned with the passing of the Negev Development Authority Law (Amendment #4, agricultural/tourism integrated projects, http://www.knesset.gov.il/committees/heb/material/data/kalkala2010-05-03-01.pdf), which gave legal support to existing and future farms and thus weakened the rule of law discourse. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that this discourse will now be wrapped into the justice discourse as this law may likely work in favor Jewish residents over Bedouins (see, e.g., Tzfadia 2010). Not without irony, an unrecognized Bedouin village of al-Arakib in the northern Negev was destroyed during the same month as the passing of the Negev Development Authority Law.

2. For example in this case, the Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages in the Negev, Bimkom—Planners for Planning Rights, and the Arab Center for Alternative Planning.


REFERENCES


